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By Francesco Drago, Tommaso Nannicini, and Francesco Sobbrio *
This paper uses an original dataset covering the presence of local 
news in medium-large Italian cities in the period 1993–2010 to 
evaluate the effects of newspaper entry and exit on electoral partici-
pation, political selection, and government efficiency. Exploiting dis-
crete changes in the number of newspapers, we show that newspaper 
entry increases turnout in municipal elections, the reelection prob-
ability of the incumbent mayor, and the efficiency of the municipal 
government. We do not find any effect on the selection of politicians. 
Competition plays a relevant role, as the effects are not limited to the 
first newspaper entry. (JEL D72, L11, L82)
Truth exists. The issue is finding someone willing to dig it up.
 — Indro Montanelli (Italian journalist)
The newspaper industry has been facing a serious crisis for at least the last decade. In most countries, the circulation of existing newspapers has shrunk 
(see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2010). 
This decline has raised concerns because a well-functioning and independent press 
is considered a vital element to inform voters and keep politicians accountable. The 
idea that news media are beneficial, if not essential, for the health of democracies 
has a long tradition in the theory of liberal democracy and is well summarized by the 
words of Thomas Jefferson: “If I had to choose between government without news-
papers, and newspapers without government, I wouldn’t hesitate to choose the latter.”
A growing literature has shown that news media have a relevant effect on electoral 
participation (Strömberg 2004; Gentzkow 2006; Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel 
2009; Snyder and Strömberg 2010; Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011; and 
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Miner 2012). News media also affect other important electoral and public policy 
 outcomes, such as incumbency advantage (Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder 
2006; Prior 2006; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Snyder and Strömberg 2010; Fergusson 
2012) and government spending (Besley and Burgess 2002; Strömberg 2004; Snyder 
and Strömberg 2010; Eisensee and Strömberg 2007). Yet, the whole spectrum of impli-
cations of news media on citizens’ welfare have not been completely investigated. In 
particular, evidence on whether news media and news media competition affect the 
selection of politicians and their performance once elected is scarce in the literature. In 
fact, not only having detailed data on politicians’ characteristics and measures of gov-
ernment performance under politicians’ direct control proves to be difficult, but it is 
also problematic to have a credible empirical design in which to address these issues.
This paper fills this gap by investigating, within the same framework, how the 
entry and exit of newspapers providing local news affect electoral participation, 
political selection (i.e., incumbency advantage and the characteristics of elected offi-
cials), and government efficiency at the local level. We also explore the role played 
by the degree of competition (i.e., the total number of newspapers) in the market for 
local news. We address these research questions in the Italian context by construct-
ing a new dataset covering the presence of local news provided by newspapers for 
all Italian municipalities above 15,000 inhabitants from 1993 to 2010. These data 
are matched with electoral outcomes in local elections where citizens directly elect 
the mayor, observable characteristics of elected mayors (gender, age, education, 
employment status), and measures of government efficiency at the municipality level 
(namely, the speed of revenue collection and the speed of payments, which are two 
commonly used benchmarks in policy analyses of local budget management in Italy).
Italian municipalities represent a suitable environment in which to assess the over-
all impact of news media since newspapers still remain a uniquely important source 
of political information at the local level. Moreover, unlike the national news market 
which is highly concentrated and subject to capture by political interest groups (see 
Durante and Knight 2012), the market for local news exhibits a wide range of varia-
tion in the extent of newspaper competition both across and within municipalities.
The identification strategy exploits discrete changes in the number of newspapers 
and the precise timing of these events (as in Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 
2011). We provide evidence that this strategy is suitable to identify causal effects 
also in the Italian context. First, we show that the entry of a newspaper in the market 
for local news generates a large and discontinuous change in readership per capita. 
Trends in newspaper readership before and after changes in the supply of newspa-
pers are essentially negligible relative to such changes. In other words, the absence 
of pretrends in newspaper readership suggests that entry and exit are not endog-
enously driven by preexisting demand for local news. Second, we show the absence 
of pretrends in all our outcome variables with respect to newspaper entry and exit, 
suggesting that omitted variables or reverse causality are not expected to contami-
nate our results. Finally, we provide evidence that controlling for a large set of (city 
and  macro-region-by-year) fixed effects absorbs the variation of factors potentially 
correlated to our outcomes and to the dynamics of newspaper entry and exit.
From a theoretical point of view, models of electoral participation suggest that 
a higher level of voters’ information leads to an increase in turnout (Matsusaka 
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1995; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996; Feddersen 2004). Accordingly,  empirical 
studies typically find that more informed individuals are more likely to turnout 
(Lassen 2005; Green and Gerber 2008; Degan and Merlo 2011; Larcinese 2009). 
The empirical evidence emerging from our study is consistent with this literature. 
Our estimates point out that the entry of newspapers in the market for local news 
has a positive effect on electoral participation in municipal elections, namely, it 
increases turnout by 0.45 percentage points. This effect translates into an 18.6 per-
cent “persuasion rate” (see DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007). Our results are in line 
with those found by Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011), who estimate an 
effect of 0.3 percentage points of newspaper entry on turnout in US presidential and 
congressional elections.
News media may have different effects on the reelection probability of incumbent 
politicians. On the one hand, an increase in the number of media outlets decreases 
the probability of media capture (Besley and Prat 2005). Hence, it decreases the 
electoral advantage of (corrupt) incumbent politicians. On the other hand, an expan-
sion in the supply of news media may make it easier for good (incumbent) politi-
cians to signal their type (Prat and Strömberg 2011). More generally, it increases 
the incentive to exert effort for politicians facing reelection concerns (Gentzkow, 
Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011; Prat and Strömberg 2011).
Our results show that an increase in the supply of local news enhances the reelec-
tion probability of incumbent mayors who decide to rerun by 10.76 percentage points 
(about 14 percent with respect to their average reelection rate), and it improves the 
efficiency of local government performance—as measured by the speed of revenue 
collection—by 2.16 percentage points (about 3 percent). By exploiting an additional 
institutional feature of Italian municipalities, where elected mayors face a two-term 
limit, we show that the effect of newspapers on government efficiency is larger (i.e., 
4.66 percentage points of higher speed of revenue collection, about 7 percent) when 
mayors are not term-limited and therefore face reelection incentives. Instead, we 
find no compelling evidence suggesting that newspapers affect the observable char-
acteristics of elected mayors. On the whole, our evidence suggests that electoral 
incentives represent the main channel linking newspapers and public policy out-
comes. We cannot rule out the existence of any effect on the unobservable charac-
teristics of politicians, but incentives seem to be first-order. While newspapers have 
a substantial impact on the accountability of elected politicians (i.e., on what they 
do once in office), they do not seem to affect the selection of politicians (i.e., who 
gets in office). This suggests that news media play an important role in informing 
voters and keeping elected politicians accountable, that is, in shaping “real” versus 
“formal” accountability (Besley 2007).
When decomposing the estimated effects by type of newspaper and by the pre-
existing market structure, two qualifiers about the impact of newspapers on elec-
toral and public policy outcomes emerge. First, newspaper competition matters. 
Our results show that the effects of newspaper entry on electoral and public policy 
outcomes are not significantly smaller when other newspapers are already present 
in the market for local news. In particular, the effects of newspaper entry on the 
behavior of voters and politicians are not limited to the first one or two outlets enter-
ing the market for local news. The second qualifier concerns the type of newspapers 
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driving the detected effects. We find that the positive effects of newspaper entry on 
electoral participation, on the incumbent mayor’s performance during her first term, 
and, ultimately, on her probability of reelection are mainly driven by local rather 
than national newspapers, by print rather than online editions, and by preexisting 
rather than new newspapers.1
This paper relates to the recent literature studying the effects of news media on 
political and public policy outcomes (see Prat and Strömberg 2011 for a compre-
hensive survey). The papers most closely related to ours are Gentzkow, Shapiro, 
and Sinkinson (2011) and Snyder and Strömberg (2010). With the first we share 
the type of media analyzed and the empirical strategy. The authors assemble a long 
(1869–2004) panel of US newspapers to study the effect of newspaper entry and 
exit on electoral politics. Their analysis shows that newspaper entry has a positive 
effect on electoral participation. Newspaper competition does not seem to play a 
role, as the effect is mostly driven by the first newspaper entering the market. With 
the second paper we share the goal of studying “the chain of media impacts link by 
link” (Snyder and Strömberg 2010) by investigating the impact of media on a large 
set of outcomes to assess the overall mechanism driving the results. The authors 
use a measure of the match, that is, “congruence,” between media markets and US 
congressional districts (i.e., share of newspaper’s readership living in a district) to 
study the effect of media coverage on voters’ information and turnout, incumbency 
advantage, congressmen behavior, and federal spending in any district. They find 
that a higher degree of congruence increases voter turnout, incumbency advantage, 
and leads politicians to pursue the interests of their constituency more effectively. In 
other words, an increase in news media coverage makes politicians more account-
able and more active in providing larger transfers to their districts.
Overall, our paper contributes to the existing literature in different respects. First, 
while previous results are consistent with a model where media provide information 
to voters, as we mentioned above, the literature does not provide direct evidence on 
how and whether this information affects the characteristics of elected politicians 
and how this translates into changes of government activity. Our setup, where news-
papers provide information at the municipality level, and thus also on local politi-
cians, allows us to provide more direct evidence on whether news media influence 
the selection of mayors, the effort they exert once they are in office, and the mech-
anisms underlying this process. While all the existing literature has analyzed the 
effect of news media on redistributive outcomes (e.g., allocation of transfers from 
the central government, as in Snyder and Strömberg 2010), evidence on whether 
news media improves the overall efficiency of public policies is still scarce. And 
while the empirical political economy literature on news media has mostly analyzed 
the effects of improved media coverage on political and public policy outcomes, 
our paper provides direct empirical evidence on the effects of increased media 
1 National newspapers are defined as outlets with national circulation that may have branches providing local 
news (i.e., local editions). Local newspapers are defined as outlets whose area of circulation is subnational. Print 
or offline editions refer to the print editions of newspapers, while online editions refer to newspaper websites with 
local news. Existing newspapers are newspapers already circulating in city i before the opening of a local edition 
with specific news on that city. New newspapers are newspapers appearing in the city at the same time as their local 
edition (see Section I for further details).
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 competition. Finally, differently from Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011), 
our analysis focuses on the role of newspaper competition in the contemporary news 
media environment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the data and institutional 
setting, as well as the economics of newspaper entry and exit. Section II presents 
our empirical strategy. Section III shows the results on the effect of newspapers on 
electoral outcomes. Section IV analyzes the impact of newspapers on the observable 
characteristics of elected politicians. Section V presents the results on local govern-
ment efficiency and discusses the mechanism behind our results. Section VI decom-
poses the effects by market structure and by newspaper type. Section VII discusses 
some validity tests. Section VIII concludes.
I. Data and Institutional Setting
A. data on newspapers
The data on Italian newspapers come from a variety of sources. The Italian 
Authority for Communication (AGCOM) provides an annual report containing the 
directory of all existing newspapers in the previous year. This report contains the 
name of each newspaper, the name and location of the firm editing it, and the number 
of printed copies. Using this directory, we manually coded the presence and location 
of every Italian newspaper from 1993 to 2010. In order to reconstruct the presence 
of a local edition in city i of a newspaper headquartered in another city, we used a 
variety of sources. First, we directly contacted the major local and national newspa-
pers and asked them the starting date of each of their local editions. Then, we ana-
lyzed the detailed information contained in Lenzi (2001), who provides information 
on all local editions, newspapers, editors, and owners up to 2000. We also gathered 
information from the detailed annual reports “Il Grande Libro della Stampa Italiana” 
(1993 to 2010) edited by prima Comunicazione, the leading specialized journal of 
the Italian media industry. We cross-checked these data with the detailed informa-
tion provided by Iannace (1989) and Grandinetti (2008). In order to construct the 
dataset of newspapers’ online editions, we used the information contained in the 
“Grande Libro della Stampa Italiana,” and then we used the website archive.org 
to establish in which year each newspaper local online edition became fully func-
tional, or ceased to provide news.
The number of newspapers is defined at the city level. Specifically, newspaper 
local editions are typically headquartered in (and provide news on) the capital of a 
province (capoluogo di provincia). Moreover, for each newspaper and for each year, 
we were able to identify whether a newspaper provided only news on the capital of 
the province or it also provided news on other cities in that province. However, it was 
not possible to gather information for all newspapers so as to identify which specific 
noncapital cities within a province were covered by the newspaper. Therefore, we 
applied a straightforward imputation method. Whenever newspaper k was provid-
ing local news on province j and local news was not restricted to the capital, we 
imputed the presence of local news provided by newspaper k in any city i with more 
than 15,000 inhabitants belonging to province j. We chose cities above 15,000 for 
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two main reasons. First, Italian municipalities with more than 15,000 use a runoff 
electoral system to elect the mayor, while municipalities below this threshold use 
a single-round system. Second, the mean and median population of Italian cities, 
in 2010, were around 7,500 and 2,500 people, respectively. Therefore, a munici-
pality with more than 15,000 people is a medium-large city for Italian standards. 
If a newspaper is providing local news on the cities belonging to a given prov-
ince, it is very likely that such news will involve (at least) any city with more than 
15,000 inhabitants.2
Similarly to Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011), we consider only news-
papers that circulate for at least four weekdays every week. Moreover, we excluded 
foreign newspapers and nonnews (real estate listings, all-sport newspapers, and 
financial newspapers). We also excluded newspapers owned by political parties, as 
they typically provide only national news. Moreover, we adopted the classification 
of the Italian association of press editors (FIEG) to distinguish between “national” 
and “local” newspapers (i.e., newspapers whose area of circulation is subnational). 
Finally, we classify as “existing” all newspapers already circulating in city i before 
the opening of a local edition covering the same city. On the contrary, we define as 
“new” a newspaper that begins to circulate in city i along with its local edition on 
that city. We also gathered data on the number of printed copies at the national level 
for all newspapers in each year from AGCOM. Moreover, for a subset of news-
papers, an independent agency (Accertamenti diffusione stampa, ADS) provides 
yearly certified data on circulation at the province level. In particular, around half 
of the newspapers in our sample, i.e., all national newspapers and around half of 
the local newspapers, have certified circulation data at the province level. For the 
remaining fraction of local newspapers in our sample, we constructed a measure of 
yearly circulation by weighting the yearly national circulation of each newspaper 
with the ratio of the population of a given province relative to the total population of 
all provinces where the newspaper provides local news.3 Finally, in order to obtain a 
measure of readership per capita, we assume that each copy is read by two individu-
als (as in Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011).
B. data on Local politics and municipal Governments
The starting year of our analysis is 1993 and coincides with the adoption of a new 
electoral system in Italian municipalities. Specifically, since March 1993, mayors 
are directly elected with plurality rule (single ballot for municipalities with less than 
15,000 inhabitants and runoff for the others). Between 1993 and 2000 the legislative 
term was four years, while after 2000 the term was extended to five years. Mayors 
are subject to a two-term limit (unless one of the two terms lasted for less than two 
years). Italian municipalities are in charge of a wide range of services, from water 
supply to waste management, from municipal police to certain infrastructures, from 
housing to welfare policies.
2 Results are robust to applying different population cutoffs (available upon request).
3 All results on the effect of newspaper entry and exit on readership are robust to restricting the analysis to news-
papers with certified data on provincial yearly circulation (see Figure A4 in the online Appendix).
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The data on the outcomes of municipal elections come from either the elec-
toral office of the Italian Ministry for Internal Affairs or from the electoral archives 
of Italian regions. The information on the individual characteristics of elected 
politicians are gathered from the “Registry of Elected Officials” (Anagrafe degli 
Amministratori) published by the Italian Ministry for Internal Affairs. Specifically, 
the Registry of Elected Officials provides information about the gender, age, high-
est educational attainment (self-declared), political affiliation, and previous job 
( self-declared) of the elected mayor.
In order to assess the performance of the municipal government, we use two effi-
ciency indicators: the speed of revenue collection (i.e., the ratio between collected 
revenues and the total amount of assessed revenues that the municipality should col-
lect within the budget year) and the speed of payment (i.e., the ratio between the out-
lays actually paid and the outlays committed in the municipal budget within the year). 
These indicators are provided by Associazione nazionale Comuni Italiani (ANCI), 
the official association of Italian municipalities, which uses them as efficiency bench-
marks to evaluate the management of municipal budgets. As a matter of fact, the 
delays in revenue collection and payments originate from the gap between cash basis 
accounting and the accruals principle of accounting; that is, some revenues and pay-
ments are recorded even if they may not have been actually received or paid in cash. 
Most importantly, the timing of cash transfers is under the control of the mayor’s 
cabinet and responds to the effectiveness of budget management. We discuss the 
interpretation of these indicators as measures of government efficiency in Section V.
To control for possible confounding factors at the local level, we also gathered 
data on the demographic and economic features of each municipality and province. 
We can control for the number of resident inhabitants for each municipality in each 
year. We also use two proxies to control for the economic characteristics of each 
province in each year. First, we use the yearly unemployment rate at the province 
level. Second, in order to capture yearly variations in economic growth at the local 
level, we employ the difference between new and ceased firms in each province in 
any given year. In the online Appendix, we provide further details on the sources of 
the variables in our dataset.
C. sample selection and market definition
The dataset contains information on electoral outcomes and characteristics of 
elected officials from 1993 to 2010. Similarly, the newspaper panel covers the period 
from 1993 to 2010. Instead, the two measures of local government efficiency cover 
the period from 1993 to 2007. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all the 
relevant variables.
Since the newspaper, electoral, political selection, and efficiency data are all at the 
city level, our analysis defines the news market to be a city. In this way we obtain a 
perfect overlap between the news market and the outcomes of interest. In particular, 
this precise definition of the news market allows us to take into account the underly-
ing heterogeneity of the effects of newspapers across different news markets.
The final dataset covers 664 Italian municipalities between 1993 and 2010. Over 
this period, we observe 1,021 city-years with net newspapers entry and 80 city-years 
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with net newspapers exit (between consecutive electoral years). In other words, on 
average, each city experiences 1.53 net entries and 0.12 net exits. Table 2 provides 
more details on the market structure transition matrix.
Entry episodes are not restricted to news markets with just a few competitors, but 
they take place everywhere (e.g., 172 markets move from 1 to 2 newspapers, 204 
from 2 to 3, 182 from 3 to 4, 84 from 4 to more than 5). Figure 1 shows the distribu-
tion of entries and exits over the sample period.4
Before discussing how we exploit the above data to identify the treatment effects 
of interest, we now describe the drivers of newspaper entry and exit in the Italian 
context. First, in Section ID, we discuss the evolution of the Italian newspaper 
industry in the sample period. Then, in Section IE, we empirically analyze the deter-
minants of newspaper entry and exit.
4 Overall, considering both electoral and nonelectoral years, there are 1,656 city-years experiencing net newspa-
per entry and 346 city-years experiencing net newspaper exit.
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics of the Outcome Variables
Mean SD Min. Max.
Number of 
city × years
Turnout 0.79 0.06 0.55 0.99 2,711
Rerun for office 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 2,129
Reelected 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 2,129
Reelected if rerun 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 960
Female 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 1,837
Age 48.99 8.66 19.00 81.00 1,837
Years of schooling 15.43 2.33 5.00 17.00 1,837
Not employed 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 1,837
Speed of collection 65.66 12.81 12.05 93.40 964
Speed of payments 75.27 6.14 45.15 96.60 964
notes: Means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values with the corresponding 
number of city × years observations are reported for all outcome variables used in the empiri-
cal analysis. “Turnout’’ is measured as a share (over the total of eligible voters); “Age’’ and 
“Years of schooling’’ are measured in years; “Speed of collection’’ and “Speed of payments’’ 
are measured in percentage points; the other variables are dummies. 
Table 2—Market Structure Transition Matrix
Newspapers at t
Newspapers at (t − 1) 1 2 3 4 5+
1 174 173 79 19 2
2 37 397 201 139 31
3 1 11 194 182 61
4 0 1 19 234 84
5+ 0 0 0 4 119
note: The table refers to the total number of newspapers in the market for local news and 
shows the number of city × years in the sample that experienced a given transition between 
consecutive electoral years, i.e., at time t versus time (t − 1).
VoL. 6 no. 3 167drago et al.: meet the press
D. Technological progress and the Expansion of Local news
Starting from the mid-1980s, the Italian newspaper industry experienced a tech-
nological revolution. Newspapers abandoned the expensive linotype and other “hot 
metal” typesetting machines by gradually adopting phototypesetting equipment 
and, later on, computerized typesetting and page composition systems (Castronovo 
2008; Murialdi and Tranfaglia 2008). These new technologies decreased both the 
cost and length of production.
These technological innovations have greatly facilitated the expansion of the 
supply of local news for two main reasons. First, the significant reduction in the 
fixed cost of production has allowed even small production facilities to be profit-
able (Grandinetti 2008; Isnenghi 2008). The second reason is represented by the 
increase in synergies. The introduction of computerized systems in the production 
process has led to a sharp decrease in the cost of exchanging materials, news agency 
releases, and advertisements among several connected newspapers. As a result, local 
and national newspapers have been able to increase their supply of local news at a 
lower cost (Agostini and Lenzi 2002; Isnenghi 2008).5 Moreover, this expansion in 
the supply of local news provided by print editions of local and national newspapers 
has been followed by the creation of newspapers’ online local editions.
These technological innovations have allowed the Italian newspaper industry to 
find a relevant source of profits in the local news market.6 The adoption of these 
5 Agostini and Lenzi (2002, 434): “Computer networks linked through a fast connection allow the exchange of 
materials, pages, news agency releases, advertisements among several connected newspapers. The production costs 
of every newspaper fall […]. The process frees resources to be allocated to local news.”
6 Fabbri (2004, 89): “In 2000, only 22 TV stations were reaching a revenue of more than 5 billion Italian Liras 
(i.e., around 2.5 million Euros) with average revenues of 10 billion. In the same year, 37 local newspapers reached 
5 billion revenues with average revenues being above 50 billion.” The Italian broadcasting sector is  dominated by 
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technological innovations and the overall profitability and competitiveness of the 
Italian newspaper industry have also been facilitated by a 1985 national legisla-
tion in support of the press industry. This legislation involved discounted loans for 
investments in new technologies, a limit to newspapers concentration of 20 percent 
of the national market, public subsidies to purchase raw paper, and unemployment 
benefits to facilitate the reduction of labor costs.7
Figure 2 illustrates the expansion of the supply of local news provided by news-
papers throughout our sample period. The average number of local news per city 
provided by newspapers has increased due to the increase in the supply of print edi-
tions of local and national newspapers and to the expansion in the number of online 
editions (see online Appendix Figure A6 for an overview of the market evolution).
At the same time, the online Appendix shows that the pattern of circulation over 
time does not show any positive trend in readership levels (see Figure A1). Hence, 
there does not exist any underlying trend suggesting an endogenous increase in the 
willingness to become informed about political news by Italian citizens.
Finally, as shown in Figure 3, the expansion in the local news provided by news-
papers has spread across all Italian provinces. In particular, this increase appears 
national television stations, which mainly provide national news. In 2008, local television channels accounted for 
less than 7 percent of the overall TV audience (AGCOM 2009). The Italian radio market is highly fragmented and 
local radios cover a small market share (Fabbri 2004).
7 The presence of direct public subsidies to the Italian press industry is not a concern for our empirical strategy. 
Subsidies are exogenously targeted to specific newspaper categories (e.g., newspapers owned by political parties or 
by religious organizations). Moreover, the law regulating these subsidies is national and thus it does not affect the 
geographical variation in the supply of newspapers within Italy.
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mostly pronounced in the provinces where there were fewer newspapers providing 
local news to start with.8
E. drivers of newspaper Entry and Exit
In this section we analyze the empirical determinants of newspaper entry and exit 
based on observable variables. We look at what explains the cross-sectional varia-
tion of entry and exit by not absorbing for any fixed effects but year fixed effects, 
and then by absorbing for city and macro-region-by-year fixed effects (as we do in 
our empirical analysis).9 In particular, we regress the event of entry or exit (a vari-
able equal to 0 if no entry or exit occurs and equal to 1 and −1 otherwise) on the set 
of observable characteristics, namely, the number of existing newspapers, the log 
of unemployment rate and population, and the net changes in the number of firms. 
Table 3 shows the results.
When controlling only for year fixed effects in column 1, socioeconomic vari-
ables seem to play a role in the (net) entry of newspapers in a local market for news. 
8 In the online Appendix, we show that a similar pattern is observed when controlling for population (see 
Figure A2). We also show the geographical distribution of changes in readership (see Figure A3).
9 While we perform this exercise both for the sample used in the empirical analysis, namely for electoral years, 
and for all years, we present only the results from our sample. When we consider all years, results are very similar 
and are available upon request.
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Figure 3. Geographical Distribution of Local Editions
note: Geographical distribution (per province) of the number of newspaper local editions at the beginning of the 
sample period (panel A) and geographical distribution of the net change in the number of local editions over the 
period (panel B).
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In particular, as expected, newspapers entry is positively correlated with population 
and the net change in the number of firms in the financial and commercial sectors 
in a given year and negatively correlated with the unemployment rate (although in 
this case the precision of the coefficient is very limited). Moreover, newspaper entry 
is significantly and negatively correlated with the number of newspapers present in 
the city in the previous year, indicating that the competitiveness of the market for 
local news represents a crucial driver of entry. Interestingly, once we control for city 
and macro-region-by-year fixed effects in columns 2 and 3, these effects disappear, 
with the important exception of the number of newspapers present in the city at 
(t − 1). In column 4, we also include political controls. Specifically, a set of dum-
mies indicating the party affiliation of the mayor and a dummy indicating whether 
the mayor’s term limit is binding or not. Results are essentially unchanged, suggest-
ing that local political cycles have a limited impact on newspaper entry and exit.
Overall, these results provide empirical support to the historical evidence discussed 
in the previous section. If the fixed effects at the city and at the  macro-region-by-year 
Table 3—Drivers of Newspaper Entry and Exit
Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspapers at (t − 1) −0.1031*** −0.3697*** −0.3485*** −0.3448***
(0.0125) (0.0267) (0.0290) (0.0295)
log population 0.1062*** 0.2543 −0.1153 −0.0850
(0.0190) (0.3560) (0.3019) (0.3055)
log provincial unemployment −0.0103 −0.1618** −0.1176 −0.1138
(0.0211) (0.0711) (0.0812) (0.0829)
Net change number of firms commercial sector 0.1309** 0.0103 −0.0391 −0.0408
(0.0607) (0.0811) (0.0848) (0.0868)
Net change number of firms financial sector 0.1395** 0.0244 0.0255 0.0304
(0.0537) (0.0672) (0.0722) (0.0741)
Mayor’s party left — — — 0.0411
( 0.0532)
Mayor’s party center — — — 0.0480
(0.1064)
Mayor’s party right — — — 0.0238
(0.0533)
Binding term limit — — — −0.0268
(0.0246)
Year FE Yes Yes No No
City FE No Yes Yes Yes
Macro-region-by-year FE No No Yes Yes
Number of city × years 2,168 2,168 2,168 2,133
r2 0.204 0.571 0.683 0.684
notes: The table reports the results of a set of regressions where the dependent variable is 1 if the city experienced 
a net newspaper entry (i.e., net increase in the number of newspaper local editions) between 2 consecutive electoral 
years (considering both national and local newspapers), −1 if it experiences a net exit, and 0 otherwise. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the city level are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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level control for demand-side factors and the number of newspapers in the previ-
ous electoral year controls for supply-side factors, then the remaining variation in 
the number of newspapers providing local news seems to be driven by structural 
changes in the supply side (i.e., drop in the production costs) rather than being the 
result of changes on the demand side. A plausible interpretation is that newspapers 
entered the market for local news where the local demand for news did not allow 
them to be profitable in earlier years due to the high production costs. When the 
production costs started decreasing, the supply of newspapers providing local news 
increased, even if the demand for local news did not change.
II. Empirical Strategy
A. specification
Let y be the outcome variable, i the municipality, h the macro-region, o the own-
ership of the newspaper, and t the electoral year. We assume that the relationship 
between the outcome variable and the number of newspapers n is captured by the 
following model:
(1)   y it =  θ ht +  γ i +  ϕ ot + β ·  n it +  x it ′ · α +  ε it , 
where  θ ht are macro-region-by-year fixed effects,  γ i are city fixed effects,  ϕ ot are 
newspaper ownership fixed effects (i.e., for each main editorial group in Italy, there 
is a dummy variable having value one if there is at least one newspaper belonging 
to that editorial group in city i ), x is a vector of time-varying control variables at 
the city or province level (namely, the log rate of provincial unemployment, the log 
of population at the city level, and the difference between the log of the number 
of firms created in year t and the log of the number of ceased firms in year t at the 
province level), and β is the the coefficient of interest.10 In line with Gentzkow, 
Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011), the unobserved component  ε it is assumed to have 
the following form:
(2)   ε it =  z it +  u it ,
where  u it is an idiosyncratic shock and  z it is the profitability of the market for local 
news in city i in a given electoral year. We estimate model (1) in first differences:
(3)  Δ y it = Δ θ ht + Δ ϕ o + β · Δ n it + Δ x it ′ · α + Δ ε it , 
10 The unemployment rate represents a proxy for the level of per capita income. Population size should absorb 
the variation in the net entry of newspapers driven by changes in population. The difference between new and 
ceased firms is a measure of the strength of the economy. Ownership fixed effects in a city are likely to control for 
the ideological slant of newspapers belonging to a given editorial group. Specifically, the editorial groups consid-
ered are: Athesis, Caltagirone Editore, Edisud, Editoriale oggi, Editrice La stampa, Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso, 
monrif, rCs, and seesab.
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where the city fixed effects disappear and Δ θ ht and Δ ϕ o are treated as macro-region 
and ownership fixed effects. The key variable Δ n it is equal to zero if no change in 
the number of newspapers occurred between t − 1 and t. Instead, we normalize Δ n it 
to be equal to 1 or −1 if city i experienced a net increase or decrease in the number 
of local news provided by newspapers, respectively. This specification allows us to 
capture sharper differences (positive, negative, or null) within and across cities in 
the supply of local news.11 At the same time, in Section A, we explicitly investigate 
how the number of preexisting newspapers in the market for local news interacts 
with the estimated effects.
B. Identification and diagnostics
The empirical challenge in estimating model (3) is that we cannot observe 
 time-varying shocks in newspaper profitability, Δ z it in Δ ε it . If these shocks are cor-
related to the electoral outcome Δ y it , we would obtain a biased estimate of our coef-
ficient of interest β. Our identifying assumption is that once we control for the large 
set of time-varying variables and fixed effects, variation in Δ n it is orthogonal to the 
unobserved component Δ ε it .
The main argument for identification is that discrete changes in the number of news-
papers lead to strong on-impact changes in readership per capita—and in turn on the 
outcome variables—that are large relative to contemporaneous changes in profitability 
(see Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011 for a detailed discussion). While we will 
provide several pieces of evidence consistent with this identifying assumption, also 
note that the results presented in Table 3 support it. Any potential correlation between 
Δ z it and Δ n it should translate into a significant and possibly strong correlation 
between the entry or exit of newspapers and observable variables presumably cor-
related with Δ z it (e.g., population and unemployment). As we have discussed, how-
ever, any correlation between the entry of newspapers and socioeconomic variables 
disappears once we control for macro-region-by-year and city fixed effects.
Another threat to identification is that local politicians may manipulate the pres-
ence of newspapers providing local news to be reelected. At the national level, pol-
iticians’ control over the media represents a serious concern, especially in Italy. 
However, at the local level, this does not seem to be the case. Most of the news-
papers in our sample are headquartered in cities different from those where local 
editions actually take place, and are thus unlikely to be captured by local politi-
cians.12 Moreover, as shown by Table 3 (and by Figures A5a and A5b in the online 
Appendix), political variables, and especially the presence of incumbent mayors up 
for reelection, are not significantly correlated with newspaper entry and exit. This 
evidence is consistent with the results of Gentzkow et al. (2012) showing that the 
influence of incumbent politicians on the US press in 1869–1928 was extremely 
limited.
11 Results are robust to alternative definitions of Δ n it , such as the exact difference in the number of total news-
papers (available upon request).
12 Our main results are also robust to restricting the analysis to variation in the supply of local news occurring 
when the incumbent mayor is term-limited (available upon request).
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In addition to the above arguments, a crucial validity test of our identifica-
tion strategy is to assess the absence of any pretrend in the outcome variables. If 
 unobserved shocks to the profitability of the market for local news affect political 
outcomes (or are driven by the same factors), we should observe past changes in the 
supply of local news to be correlated with current changes in political outcomes, or 
vice versa. We check for the existence of pretrends in several ways. As in Gentzkow, 
Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011), we reestimate the model in first differences, includ-
ing leads and lags of newspaper entry and exit:
(4)  Δ y it = Δ θ ht + Δ ϕ o +  ∑ 
k=−2
 
k=2
 β k · Δ n i(t−k) + Δ x it ′ · α + Δ ε it .
Here,  β 0 is the equivalent of the instantaneous treatment effect β in model (3). The 
coefficients  β k with k < 0 test for the existence of pretrends, as they reflect the rela-
tionship between current changes in the number of newspapers and past changes in 
the outcomes. To validate our identifying assumption, we expect these coefficients 
not to be statistically different from zero. The coefficients  β k with k > 0 capture 
dynamic treatment effects (if any), as they reflect the relationship between current 
changes in the number of newspapers and future changes in the outcomes. Because 
the cities in our sample are observed, on average, for 4.3 electoral terms (minimum 
3, maximum 7), we can estimate equation (4) only on a small subsample of our data. 
Therefore, in order to increase sample size and to be conservative, we also estimate 
the coefficient of each Δ n i(t−k) in a separate regression; in other words, we reesti-
mate model (3) by replacing Δ n i(tk) with each Δ n i(t−k) in turn. These validity tests 
are reported in Section VII.13
Finally, in the online Appendix, we assess to what extent our baseline estimates 
may be due to random chance, as opposed to a true causal effect, by performing 
placebo tests based on the simulation of false entries and exits. We select a sub-
sample of municipalities that never experienced either newspaper entry or exit, and 
we randomly assign false entry and exit episodes, according to the shares of entry 
and exit observed in the other municipalities. We then estimate the treatment effect 
of these false episodes (which on average should be zero) and repeat the estimation 
10,000 times. By plotting the cumulative distribution function of these simulations, 
we expect to observe only a few false effects (e.g., less than 5 percent) to be larger 
than the true baseline estimate in absolute value.
13 In the online Appendix, we perform two additional robustness checks. First, we exploit the yearly variation 
in our data—as opposed to the variation by electoral term exploited in equation (4)—and estimate a version of 
model (4) using annual leads and lags within the electoral term affected by the newspaper entry or exit (with k rang-
ing from −3 to 3 in this case, as electoral terms lasted 4 years for most of our sample period). Second, we evaluate 
whether the number of newspapers in city i and year t is correlated with our outcomes in the previous elections by 
estimating an equation analogous to model (1):
 n it =  θ ht +  γ i +  ϕ o +  π t−τ ·  y i(t−τ) +  x it ′ · α +  ε it . 
To rule out confounding pretrends, we expect  π t−τ , for τ = 1, 2, 3, not to be statistically different from zero.
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III. Newspapers and Electoral Outcomes
A. Electoral participation
In this section, we focus on voters’ electoral participation in municipal elections. 
As a first step, we also look at the effect of an expansion in the supply of local news 
on readership per capita. Since readership data are available only at the province 
level, we use the weighted average of newspaper entry in all the cities belonging to 
a given province.14 Figure 4 illustrates how readership evolves around the time of 
an expansion in the number of local news supplied by newspapers, by estimating the 
analog of equation (4) on annual readership data.15 Here, we focus on the effect on 
readership of an expansion of local news provided by print newspaper editions, so as 
to ensure consistency between the dependent and the explanatory variable.
As shown by the estimated coefficients in Figure 4, an increase in the supply of 
newspapers providing local news has a large positive impact on readership of around 
10 percentage points. Moreover, the effect occurs on impact. That is, dynamic 
effects after the event are small relative to the instantaneous effect of the event. The 
estimates also show that there is no trend in per capita demand for newspapers prior 
14 Specifically, entry is expressed in terms of the provincial weighted average of entry per capita; weights cor-
respond to the ratio of the municipal population over the provincial population.
15 Note that in this figure, unlike equation (4), the time dimension refers to all the years in the sample (i.e., 
1993–2010), since the sample of electoral years would not have allowed us to estimate the specification with 4 leads 
and 4 lags (given that each city experiences, on average, only 4.3 elections).
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 r
ea
de
rs
hi
p 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
Year relative to change in the number of newspapers’ local editions
Figure 4. Changes in Readership per Capita around Newspaper Entry and Exit
notes: Dependent variable: readership per capita at the province level. Regression coefficients 
of four (yearly) leads and four (yearly) lags with respect to the year of entry of a (print) news-
paper local edition. Entry is expressed as the provincial weighted average (by population) of 
entry per capita. Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered 
by province. All years from 1993 to 2010.
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to the event, that is, before the entry of a newspaper in the market. If anything, read-
ership per capita declines before entry.16 Column 1 of Table 4 reports the estimate 
of model (3) with readership per capita as outcome. Again, units of observation are 
110 Italian provinces in this case. “Newspapers” refers to the coefficient of news-
paper entry and exit, Δ n it . Consistently with Figure 4, the estimated coefficient is 
positive and significant both in statistical and economic terms.
Column 2 of Table 4 reports the estimate of model (3) where Δ y it represents the 
difference between the turnout rate in municipal election in city i and year t rela-
tive to the turnout rate in the same city and electoral year t − 1. Now, the units of 
observations are all 2,014 elections in our dataset. The results show that the entry 
of newspapers increases turnout by 0.45 percentage points (about 0.6 percent with 
respect to the average turnout).
To assess the magnitude of the effects with respect to the existing literature, we 
compute the corresponding persuasion rate (see DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007). 
Within our context, the persuasion rate represents the number of individuals who 
changed their turnout decision following newspaper entry, as a fraction of all indi-
viduals who could have changed their behavior. To properly compute this statistics, 
we need to compare homogeneous newspaper categories. Since our readership data 
refer only to newspaper print editions, a proper assessment of the persuasion rate 
requires to estimate the effect of newspaper print editions on both readership and 
turnout. Section VIB shows that the entry of a newspaper print edition increases 
turnout by 0.47 percentage points and readership per capita by 11 percentage points. 
16 These patterns are robust to limiting the analysis to the subset of newspapers with certified provincial reader-
ship data (see Figure A4 in the online Appendix).
Table 4—Newspapers, Readership, and Electoral Outcomes
Readership Turnout Rerun for office Reelected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspapers 0.0583*** 0.0045*** 0.0763 0.1076**
(0.0122) (0.0017) (0.0485) (0.0535)
Number of province × years 1,712
Number of provinces 110
Number of city × years 2,014 924 546
Number of cities 658 644 486
r2 0.1233 0.6195 0.1761 0.2232
notes: Models are estimated in first differences—see equation (3) in the text. All specifications 
include macro-region-by-year and ownership fixed effects, log of population, log of changes 
in the number of new and ceased firms in the commercial and financial sector, and log of the 
unemployment rate. The dependent variable in column 1 is defined at the province level, while 
in columns 2–4 it is defined at the city level. Column 3 reports the results of the model esti-
mated by conditioning the regression on electoral terms where the mayor’s term limit is not 
binding. Column 4 reports the results of the model estimated by conditioning the regression on 
electoral terms where the mayor decided to rerun for office. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses are clustered by province for column 1 and by city for columns 2–5. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Since the average turnout in city-years not experiencing an increase in the supply 
of local news is equal to 77 percent, 23 percent of eligible voters could be “per-
suaded” by the entry of a newspaper. Moreover, within the population of those who 
would abstain absent newspaper entry, 11 percent read a newspaper, representing 
2.53 percent of all eligible voters (implicitly assuming that voters are as likely as 
non-voters to read newspapers). Hence, the 0.47 percent of voters who vote follow-
ing the expansion in the supply of local news corresponds to a persuasion rate of 
(0.47/0.0253) = 18.6 percent. The size of this effect is close to the highest value 
found in the literature on voters’ persuasion (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010) and 
similar to other works estimating the effect of local news on turnout ( Oberholzer-Gee 
and Waldfogel 2010). Indeed, as we estimate the effect of local news on local elec-
tions (i.e., we define the news market to be a city), the news analyzed in our study is 
likely to be more salient than those investigated in previous studies.
B. Incumbent mayor’s reelection
Column 3 in Table 4 reports the estimated effect of newspaper entry and exit on 
the probability of the incumbent mayor deciding to run for her second term. Here, 
Δ y it represents the difference between the decision of the incumbent mayor in city i 
and year t to run for reelection with respect to the analogous decision of the previous 
incumbent mayor. There is some evidence that this probability increases with the 
entry of new sources of local news. The expansion of local news increases the prob-
ability to run for a second term by 7.63 percentage points, corresponding to about a 
13 percent increase relative to the average. However, the coefficient is imprecisely 
estimated and not statistically different from zero.
Column 4 shows the effect of newspaper entry and exit on the probability of the 
incumbent mayor being reelected (conditional on rerunning for office). In this case, 
the effect of local news is not only positive, but also statistically different from zero. 
The entry of newspapers increases the difference in the incumbent’s probability of 
reelection by 10.76 percentage points, corresponding to a 14 percent increase rela-
tive to the average.
Clearly, the positive impact of newspapers on the incumbent’s reelection may 
be due to alternative channels with different implications for voters’ welfare. 
Newspapers may be captured by incumbent politicians and used as “lap-dogs” (e.g., 
see Di Tella and Franceschelli 2011). However, as discussed by Besley and Prat 
(2005), the higher the number of news sources, the harder for incumbent politicians 
to capture media outlets, because hiding political scandals would require them to 
suppress news from all media. Hence, our average positive effect of newspaper entry 
on the incumbent’s reelection probability is unlikely to be due to media capture 
alone, especially if this effect persists as competition increases (see Section VIA). 
At the same time, an increase in the supply of news is likely to increase the visibility 
of politicians in office, and it may make it easier for the good ones to signal their 
type. It may also enhance the accountability of incumbents and thus increase their 
effort.
To disentangle between the multiple channels linking newspapers, politicians, 
and public policy, the remaining part of our analysis addresses three complementary 
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research questions. First, in Section IV, we investigate whether newspaper entry has 
an impact on the mayor’s type (i.e., on the observable characteristics of mayors). 
In Section V, we tackle the issue of newspapers’ influence on the mayor’s effort by 
exploring how entry affects local government efficiency, and we also investigate the 
role of term limits. Third, in Section VIA, we study the role of media competition by 
looking at possible nonlinearities in the effects.
IV. Newspapers and Political Selection
This section evaluates the effect of changes in the supply of newspapers provid-
ing local news on the characteristics of elected politicians. The main advantage of 
our study with respect to the existing literature is to have direct measures of politi-
cians’ characteristics.17 In particular, we look at the mayor’s gender, age, years of 
schooling, and previous employment status. These variables allow us to assess the 
extent of newspaper influence on political selection along several dimensions. In 
the ranking of women in national parliaments, Italy is at the fifty-first place world-
wide and at the twenty-fourth place (out of 27) within Europe (Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) 2011). In municipal governments, women account for only 7 percent 
of mayors. At the same time, Italy is widely considered as a “gerontocracy” given 
the high average age of politicians (e.g., the average age of mayors is about 50 years 
old). Female and young candidates typically represent the “underdogs” in electoral 
races. Thus, analyzing the effect of newspapers on mayor’s gender and age may 
provide evidence on whether an increase in the supply of local news lowers the bar-
riers to entry into political representation. Years of schooling, instead, are commonly 
used as a measure of the quality of politicians (e.g., Merlo et al. 2010; Galasso and 
Nannicini 2011). Finally, previous employment status may capture idiosyncratic 
skills along the competence dimension. Table 5 shows the estimation results.
The estimates show that there is no compelling evidence of any effect of newspa-
pers on the mayor’s characteristics. The coefficients are small in size and imprecisely 
estimated. Overall, while a change in the supply of local news has an effect on turn-
out and on the incumbent’s reelection probability, it does not affect the (observable) 
characteristics of elected politicians, that is, their type.18 At the same time, even if 
the characteristics of elected mayors analyzed here capture a wide range of personal 
attributes, it might still be the case that newspapers have an effect on (unobservable) 
characteristics of elected mayors orthogonal to those we use. In order to investigate 
this issue further, Section VB uses term limit to disentangle whether the effect of 
newspapers on government efficiency (if any) is likely to be due to the impact of 
newspapers on the mayor’s type or effort.
17 Snyder and Strömberg (2010) control for politicians’ fixed effects to isolate incentives from selection in their 
regressions. They show that their results are essentially unchanged to the inclusion of fixed effects (with the excep-
tion of party loyalty). They do not focus, however, on politicians’ observable characteristics.
18 Indeed, also in the sample under analysis (which is a subsample of the one considered in Section IIIA because 
of missing values in politicians’ observable characteristics), we observe a positive effect of local news on electoral 
turnout (results available upon request).
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V. Newspapers and Public Policy Outcomes
A. Local Government Efficiency
The above results show that the entry of newspapers increases electoral participa-
tion and improves the reelection chances of the incumbent mayor, but does not affect 
mayor’s (observable) characteristics. A crucial issue at this point is whether news-
papers affect the performance of local governments, in order to assess whether the 
higher reelection probability of incumbent mayors can be attributed to an improve-
ment in their effort or not.
To address this issue, we evaluate the impact of newspaper entry and exit on two 
indicators of local government efficiency: the average speed of revenue collection 
and the average speed of payments during the mayoral term. These measures are 
commonly used as efficiency benchmarks both in policy analysis (e.g., ANCI 2012) 
and in the scientific literature (e.g., Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013) for several 
reasons. With respect to taxes, the speed of revenue collection is expected to increase 
if the local government is able to fight tax evasion, which is a compelling problem 
for government effectiveness in Italy. Moreover, with respect to transfers, the speed 
of revenue collection is expected to increase if the local government is effective in 
implementing centrally financed public works, so as to receive new blocks of capital 
transfers. The speed of payments is instead expected to increase if the local govern-
ment is effective in meeting its promises of payment to private contractors.
The sample of city-years where we assess the effect of newspapers on local gov-
ernment efficiency contains a limited number of observations (compared with the 
sample on electoral participation) for two reasons. First, these measures are avail-
able only for a subset of cities (around 574). Second, these measures are available 
only for the period 1993–2007. We estimate model (3), where Δ y it represents the 
difference between each efficiency measure during the electoral term starting in 
year t with respect to the previous term.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 report the estimation results for the two efficiency 
measures in the all sample. Although statistical accuracy is hampered by the small 
Table 5—Newspapers and Politicians’ Selection
Female Age Years of schooling Not employed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspapers −0.0162 −0.4339 0.0212 0.0043
(0.0147) (0.5725) (0.1329) (0.0144)
Number of city × years 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837
Number of cities 657 657 657 657
r2 0.0574 0.0533 0.0466 0.0569
notes: Models are estimated in first differences—see equation (3) in the text. All specifications 
include macro-region-by-year and ownership fixed effects, log of population, log of changes 
in the number of new and ceased firms in the commercial and financial sector, and log of the 
unemployment rate. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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number of observations, the estimates show that an increase in the supply of local 
news improves the efficiency of municipal governments. In particular, the speed of 
revenue collection increases by 2.16 percentage points, which represents a 3 percent 
increase with respect to the average value of this efficiency indicator. At the same 
time, it is not possible to make an inference on the effect of newspapers on the speed 
of payments, because the estimated coefficients are associated with very large stan-
dard errors.
Our result on revenue collection is consistent with the evidence provided by 
Casaburi and Troiano (2012), who show that Italian mayors have a higher prob-
ability of being reelected when they are effective in fighting tax evasion.19 Also in 
our case, it seems that voters tend to reward incumbent mayors for their increased 
effort in this respect. On the whole, our results suggest that an expansion in the sup-
ply of local news increases the accountability of elected politicians.20 This shows 
that newspapers may play a positive role on citizens’ welfare even when they do 
not increase their electoral participation. Indeed, the increase in electoral turnout 
only reflects the increase in the level of information of citizens who abstained in 
the previous election. An expansion in the supply of local news, however, is also 
very likely to increase the level of information of those who already voted in the 
previous election. This may translate into a higher level of local government effi-
ciency for two distinct reasons. First, the higher level of citizens’ information may 
lead to a better selection of politicians. That is, it may improve the competence of 
elected politicians along dimensions that are not captured by (and are orthogonal 
19 A standard deviation of their measure of reduced tax evasion increases the incumbent mayor’s reelection 
probability by 2.2 percentage points. In our case, absent any other direct effect of newspaper entry on reelection 
(which are on the contrary likely to be first order), one more percentage point of speed of collection would increase 
reelection by 4.4 percentage points. It is therefore plausible that tax evasion is only one of the multiple channels 
linking newspaper entry, government efficiency, and incumbent’s reelection.
20 Interestingly, this effect seems to go beyond the impact of newspapers on electoral participation. Indeed, in 
the subsample of city-years used for the estimates of Table 6, the effect of the entry of newspapers on turnout is 
small and not statistically significant (results available upon request).
Table 6—Newspapers and Government Efficiency
Speed of Speed of Speed of Speed of
collection payments collection payments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newspapers 2.1636** −0.0198 4.6599*** 0.1617
(1.0851) (0.4591) (1.5045) (0.6462)
Number of city × years 964 964 559 559
Number of cities 574 574 478 478
r2 0.5647 0.1464 0.5450 0.1814
notes: Models are estimated in first differences—see equation (3) in the text. All specifications 
include macro-region-by-year and ownership fixed effects, log of population, log of changes 
in the number of new and ceased firms in the commercial and financial sector, and log of the 
unemployment rate. Columns 1–2 use the all sample. Columns 3–4 report the results of the 
model estimated by conditioning the regressions on electoral terms where the mayor’s term 
limit is not binding. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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to) the observable characteristics analyzed in Section IV. Second, the higher level 
of citizens’ information may improve the accountability of elected politicians and 
increase their incentive to exert effort.
In order to better disentangle between these two channels—unobservable selec-
tion versus reelection incentives—the next section analyzes how newspapers affect 
the effort of the incumbent mayor when she is in her first electoral term (i.e., when 
she faces reelection incentives), and then compares the results with those discussed 
in this section.
B. selection versus Incentives
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 replicate the analysis of the previous section for 
the subsample of electoral terms where the mayor’s term limit is not binding. The 
results illustrate two main points. First, the effect of newspapers on local govern-
ment efficiency when incumbent mayors face reelection incentives is more statis-
tically significant than the one obtained when considering both first and second 
terms (despite the fact that the sample contains a smaller number of observations). 
Second, the size of the effect on the speed of revenue collection is more than dou-
ble the effect estimated in the previous section for all mayors. In the subsample of 
nonbinding electoral terms, an expansion in the supply of local news increases the 
speed of revenue collection by 4.66 percentage points, corresponding to a 7 percent 
increase relative to the average.
From a theoretical point of view, the above results implicitly point in the direction 
of a mechanism where voters interpret the high effort of mayors during their first 
term as a signal of their competence. Indeed, given that rational voters anticipate 
that a term-limited mayor in the next period would exert zero effort, they should 
reward the incumbent mayor’s effort only if it represented a signal of her idiosyn-
cratic skills. Hence, an increase in the supply of local news should have a positive 
impact both on the incumbent mayor’s effort in her first term and on the expected 
competence of reelected mayors. In the online Appendix, we present a simple theo-
retical framework summarizing this mechanism.
Furthermore, the higher significance and larger magnitude of the effect of news-
papers on government efficiency when the incumbent mayor is not term-limited, 
together with the insignificant effect of newspapers on the observable characteristics 
of politicians, suggest that incentives represent the main channel linking newspapers 
to public policy outcomes.
VI. Decomposing the Effects
A. decomposition by market structure
The above results show that newspaper entry and exit have a relevant impact on 
the behavior of voters and politicians. The entry of newspapers in the market for 
local news has a positive effect on electoral participation, on the reelection probabil-
ity of incumbent mayors, and on the efficiency of local governments. At this point, a 
natural question that needs to be addressed concerns the role played by competition. 
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That is, it is important to qualify the above results with respect to the existing degree 
of competition in the market for local news. Is newspaper entry important only when 
there are no (or very few) sources of news to start with? Or is the expansion in the 
supply of newspapers relevant regardless of the preexisting degree of competition?
To analyze this issue, we augment equation (3) by including a set of interactions 
between Δ n it and dummy indicators for the number of preexisting newspapers at (t − 1) in city i. Since there are very few cities with no newspapers at the beginning 
of the sample period, we look at differences among cities in which the number of 
preexisting newspapers is larger or equal to one. Table 7 reports the results.
In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variables are the difference in turnout and in 
the mayor’s reelection outcome conditional on rerunning, respectively. In columns 3 
and 4, we use the difference in the speed of collection for all electoral terms and for 
the subsample of electoral terms where term limit is not binding, respectively. The 
table reports the linear combinations between our main variable (Δ n it ) and the inter-
action terms between Δ n it and the dummies indicating the number of preexisting 
newspapers at (t − 1). The impact of newspaper entry in the market for local news 
on political and public policy outcomes does not decrease with the number of preex-
isting newspapers; it is about the same if the city had one, two, or three newspapers 
in the previous electoral term—with just one exception in column 3 for government 
efficiency in the all sample.
In particular, the results on reelection and on the speed of revenue collection 
point out that media capture by the incumbent mayor is unlikely to be the mecha-
nism behind our overall results. Otherwise, we would expect the positive effect on 
the incumbent’s reelection to vanish as media competition increases. Instead, the 
Table 7—Relevant Effects by Number of (Preexisting) Newspapers
Speed of Speed of
Turnout Reelected collection collection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
City has one newspaper 0.0055 0.1337 3.6895* 4.7940*
(0.0035) (0.1167) (2.1903) (2.7346)
City has two newspapers 0.0066*** 0.1365** 2.4779* 5.2125***
(0.0022) (0.0646) (1.3291) (1.9980)
City has three newspapers 0.0050 0.0496 −0.6881 4.0048
(0.0036) (0.0940) (2.3171) (2.8306)
Number of city × years 2,014 546 964 559
Number of cities 658 486 574 478
r2 0.6252 0.2280 0.5665 0.5474
notes. Models are estimated in first differences—see equation (3) in the text—with interac-
tion terms between indicators of the number of newspapers in the previous electoral term and 
the main variable of interest Δ n it . The rows report linear combinations between the coeffi-
cients of the number of newspapers in the previous term and of Δ n it . All specifications include 
 macro-region-by-year and ownership fixed effects, log of population, log of changes in the 
number of new and ceased firms in the commercial and financial sector, and log of the unem-
ployment rate. Columns 3–4 report the results for the speed of revenue collection for the all 
sample and for the subsample of electoral terms where the term limit of the incumbent mayor 
is not binding, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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beneficial effects of increasing newspaper competition (i.e., of allowing more media 
outlets to enter the market for local news) are relevant even when there are already 
other newspapers supplying local news.
B. decomposition by newspaper Type
In Table 8, we decompose the relevant effects detected above by type of news-
paper. Our dataset allows us to explore different dimensions. In particular, we can 
distinguish between the net entry of a newspaper print edition and the net entry 
Table 8—Relevant Effects by Newspaper Type
Readership Turnout Reelected
Speed of 
collection
Speed of 
collection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
panel A
Print editions 0.111*** 0.0047*** 0.0849* 1.1383 3.7863***
(0.0216) (0.0015) (0.0478) (1.0369) (1.3726)
Online editions 0.0117 0.0016 0.0795 3.3926*** 3.9059**
(0.0114) (0.0023) (0.0627) (1.1562) (1.5397)
p-value of difference 0.0001 0.2487 0.9440 0.0837 0.9474
r2 0.123 0.6197 0.2208 0.5667 0.5474
panel B
Local newspapers 0.0626*** 0.0051*** 0.0735 1.0925 3.5500**
(0.0130) (0.0017) (0.0527) (1.1414) (1.5244)
National newspapers −0.0141 0.0011 0.0511 2.8562* 1.3692
(0.0208) (0.0037) (0.1045) (1.4589) (1.9152)
p-value of difference 0.0026 0.3345 0.8500 0.3445 0.3732
r2 0.117 0.6199 0.2201 0.5641 0.5410
panel C
New newspapers 0.0868*** 0.0041** 0.0499 0.3483 3.7159*
(0.0220) (0.0018) (0.0677) (1.5505) (2.1275)
Existing newspapers 0.0517*** 0.0042** 0.0809 3.2602*** 5.6756***
(0.0144) (0.0017) (0.0499) (1.0557) (1.4189)
p-value of difference 0.1683 0.9797 0.6835 0.1052 0.4439
r2 0.118 0.7137 0.2208 0.5678 0.5534
Number of province × years 1,712
Number of provinces 110
Number of city × years 2,014 546 964 559
Number of cities 658 486 574 478
notes: Models are estimated in first differences—see equation (3) in the text. The effects 
are estimated by decomposing the entry/exit variable (Δ n it ) in print versus online editions (panel A), local versus national newspapers (panel B), and new versus preexisting newspapers 
(panel C). In each panel, p-value of difference refers to the p-value of a Wald test on the null 
hypothesis that the difference of the estimates in the two subsamples is equal to zero. All spec-
ifications include macro-region-by-year and ownership fixed effects, log of population, log of 
changes in the number of new and ceased firms in the commercial and financial sector, and log 
of the unemployment rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by province for 
column 1 and by city for columns 2–5.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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of a newspaper online edition (panel A); between local and national newspapers 
(panel B); or between newspapers already circulating in the city and new  newspapers 
entering the market for local news (panel C). In each panel, the two (net) entry vari-
ables sum up to the (net) entry variable referring to any type of newspaper used in 
the previous sections. For each decomposition, we also report the p-value of a Wald 
test on the null hypothesis that the difference between the estimates in the two sub-
samples is equal to zero.
print versus online Editions.—Panel A of Table 8 suggests that the print edi-
tions of newspapers providing local news have a larger impact than online editions, 
although the differences (with the obvious exception of readership) are generally 
insignificant at standard levels. Indeed, an expansion in the supply of local news 
due to an increase in print editions corresponds to an increase in the number of local 
news sources. Instead, online editions typically provide contents that are similar 
to their offline counterparts while lowering the cost of obtaining news. Our results 
indicate that both components play a relevant role, although the expansion in local 
news sources is likely to be the dominant channel.21
Local versus national newspapers.—Panel B of Table 8 shows that local news-
papers have a positive and significant impact on newspapers’ readership, on elec-
toral turnout, and on local government efficiency (especially when the incumbent 
mayor is not term limited). Point estimates for national newspapers are also positive 
and not statistically different from those of local newspapers (with the exception of 
readership), but they are smaller in size and not precisely estimated. As shown by 
the market structure transition matrices by newspaper type presented in the online 
Appendix (see Tables A3a–A3f), the variation in national newspaper entry and exit 
is limited compared to other newspaper categories and especially to local newspa-
pers. As a result, the lower precision of the estimated coefficients for national news-
papers might be due to the lower power of the test. Yet, it is tempting to speculate on 
the potential theoretical mechanisms behind the above differences.
While an increase in the number of local newspapers providing local news is 
likely to increase the number of voters informed on local politics, this may not 
be necessarily the case with national newspapers. Throughout our sample, national 
newspapers typically open a local edition in cities where incumbent local newspa-
pers are already providing local news. This is relevant because local newspapers 
typically cover political as well as nonpolitical information (e.g., weather forecasts, 
pharmacies’ schedule, obituaries, movie theaters listing, etc.). Readers mainly inter-
ested in local nonpolitical information have to buy a local newspaper to get this 
type of information, in the absence of a national newspaper providing it. Hence, 
these readers may become informed about local politics as a by-product of buy-
ing the local newspaper.22 When a national newspaper enters the market for local 
news, some of these readers may switch from the local to the national newspaper. 
21 In online Appendix Table A1, we show that our baseline results are not sensitive to dropping online entries 
that are contemporaneous to the creation of print editions.
22 See Downs (1957); Popkin (1991); and Prior (2007) for theories on by-product learning.
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As a result, they may turn their attention away from local politics (e.g., spending 
more time reading about national politics). Their electoral participation in municipal 
elections may thus decrease (i.e., there may be a crowding-out effect of national 
newspapers as in George and Waldfogel 2008). At the same time, the introduction 
of a national newspaper’s local edition increases the supply of local news offered to 
its readers, and their electoral participation may increase. At the end of the day, the 
overall (net) effect of the entry of national newspapers may be positive, negative, or 
null depending on the extent of these two opposite effects. Overall, our results point 
out that the combined effect is not statistically different from zero.23
Existing versus new newspapers.—Finally, panel C of Table 8 shows that the 
opening of local editions by existing newspapers and the arrival of new newspapers 
display similar effects, although the impact of existing newspapers on policy out-
comes is relatively larger. Indeed, the extra provision of local news by both exist-
ing and new newspapers is likely to raise voters’ level of information through an 
increase in readership (extensive margin). At the same time, the extra provision of 
local news by existing newspapers is also likely to affect voters who were already 
reading those newspapers in the absence of local news (intensive margin). In online 
Appendix Table A2, we further decompose local, national, and existing newspapers 
by looking at whether their net entry involved a print or an online edition, detecting 
consistent results.
VII. Validity Tests
In this section, we empirically assess the validity of out identification strategy by 
means of both pretrend falsification tests and placebo simulations.
Along the lines discussed in Section IIB, we test the impact of two leads and two 
lags of newspaper net entry (Δ n i(t−k) ), as well as of contemporaneous net entry (for 
k = 0), on the relevant outcomes. Specifically, we focus on the outcomes for which 
we detected significant effects with our baseline results, namely, turnout, reelec-
tion, and government efficiency (the latter both in the all sample and for mayors 
facing reelection incentives). Leads and lags are calculated by electoral terms, as 
our outcome variables only vary by term. We first estimate 5 separate regressions by 
replacing Δ n it with Δ n i(t−k) in equation (3), so as to have a large enough sample to 
identify a coefficient  β k for each k = −2, −1, 0, 1, 2.
In Figure 5, we report the estimated coefficients of these regressions and 95 per-
cent confidence intervals. Importantly, for k = −2, −1, no point estimate is sta-
tistically different from zero, supporting the assumption that treated and control 
municipalities were not on separate outcome trends before the entry or exit of news-
papers. In terms of dynamics, there are no delayed effects of net newspaper entry in 
23 To shed more light on the coverage of local news by different types of newspapers, we implemented a case 
study on one Italian region (Emilia Romagna) based on the database Factiva, containing all articles by a subset of 
newspapers in our sample. We searched for the number of articles mentioning mayors who ran for reelection or their 
future challengers over the first term. Articles about challengers are about 10 percent of those about incumbents in 
local newspapers, as opposed to 30 percent in national newspapers. In general, the number of articles covering local 
politicians is higher in local than in national newspapers.
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subsequent terms (for k = 1, 2), although this might be due to future adjustments 
in the local media market. In online Appendix Figure A8, as a further robustness 
check, we estimate equation (4) in a unique sample. Because of data limitation, we 
can only estimate this specification with k = −1, 0, 1. It is reassuring, however, 
that also in this case there is virtually no association between current changes in the 
number of newspapers and past changes in the relevant outcomes.
In online Appendix Figure A9, we also exploit the annual variability of our data 
by estimating a version of equation (4) in which k captures the years from the entry/
exit episode. We estimate it with k = −3, −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, 3 because we want to 
focus on the term preceding and on the term following net entry. Coefficients on 
the left of zero test for the existence of any (yearly) pretrend between treated and 
control cities; coefficients on the right of zero detect heterogeneous effects due to 
newspaper entry happening one, two, or three years before the year of election. No 
significant pretrend is evident in any outcome. In terms of dynamics, government 
efficiency is the outcome with more delayed effects, as the impact is initially larger 
for years farther away from the entry episode.24
24 Online Appendix Tables A4, A5, and A6 directly evaluate whether the net entry of newspapers is determined 
by past realizations of the relevant outcomes, again finding no evidence of any pretrend. As a final falsification 
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Figure 5. Changes in Relevant Outcomes around Newspaper Entry and Exit
notes: Dependent variables: turnout rate, reelection rate (mayors who run for reelection only), speed of collection 
(all sample), and speed of collection (mayors with nonbinding term limit only). Models are estimated as in equation 
(3) by replacing Δ n it with the leads/lags Δ n i(t−k) , with k = −2, −1, 0, 1, 2. In other words, the graphs show regres-
sion coefficients of two leads (by term) and two lags (by term) with respect to the electoral term of entry or exit of a 
(print) newspaper local edition. Standard errors are clustered by city. Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Finally, as discussed in Section IIB, we perform a series of permutation-based 
placebo tests (see online Appendix Figures A10–A13). Specifically, the figures 
show the cumulative distribution function of 10,000 placebo estimates of the impact 
of false entries and exits on the relevant outcomes. Placebo coefficients are normal-
ized as percentage points of the true baseline result. This means, for instance, that 
a normalized coefficient of 100 stands for a placebo estimate equal to the baseline 
estimate. To validate our results, we expect most normalized coefficients to be close 
to 0, and to observe only a few of them outside the interval [−100, +100]—in fact 
no more than 5 percent in each tail. Indeed, for turnout, only 0.02 percent of the false 
effects are above 100, and none of them are below −100. For reelection, 0.32 per-
cent are above 100 and 0.1 percent below −100. For government efficiency in the all 
sample, 0.08 percent are above 100, and 0.1 percent below −100. For government 
efficiency in the sample of mayors who can be reelected, none of the false effects is 
outside the interval from −100 and 100. Overall, this evidence strongly reinforces 
the conclusion that our baseline results cannot just be attributed to random chance.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper evaluates how newspapers affect electoral participation, as well as the 
selection and the performance of politicians. We use an original dataset covering the 
presence of local news by different types of newspapers for medium-large Italian 
municipalities, and find a robust positive impact of the supply of local news on 
turnout, the reelection probability of incumbent mayors, and municipal government 
efficiency. Our heterogeneity results show that print editions, local newspapers, and 
existing newspapers have a larger impact on local politics than their counterparts 
(that is, online editions, national newspapers, and new newspapers, respectively). 
Overall, our evidence shows that newspapers still remain a uniquely important 
source of information on local politics.
The institutional framework of Italian municipalities, where mayors face a 
 two-term limit, provides the perfect testing ground to shed more light on the poten-
tial channels linking newspapers and politicians’ behavior. Our results show that the 
effect of newspapers on government efficiency is (considerably) larger when mayors 
are in their first term, and thus face reelection incentives. At the same time, there is 
no compelling evidence that newspapers have a relevant impact on the (observable) 
characteristics of elected mayors. Although we cannot rule out the existence of any 
effect of newspapers on the unobservable characteristics of mayors, this evidence 
suggests that incentives—rather than selection—seem to represent the main channel 
linking newspapers and politicians’ behavior.
We also find that competition does matter, as the positive impact of newspaper 
entry does not vanish when more newspapers are in the market. From a  comparative 
perspective, our results are relevant for the debate on competition and localism in 
exercise, we predict the relevant outcomes from our socioeconomic covariates (listed in Table 3), and then regress 
the predicted values on newspaper net entry; none of the estimates is statistically different from 0: −0.0001 for 
turnout ( p-value: 0.403), −0.0048 for reelection (0.538), 0.0096 for revenue collection in the all sample (0.891), 
0.0128 (0.884).
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the United States. We provide supporting evidence to the claim that promoting local-
ism and competition in the market for news may have positive effects on electoral 
participation and on government performance.
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